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INTRODUCTION 
On July 27, 1985, four African National Congress leaders and anti-
apartheid activists—Matthew Goniwe, Fort Calata, Sparrow Mkonto, and 
Sicelo Mhlauli—left a meeting of the anti-apartheid group United 
Democratic Front (UDF) in Port Elizabeth for a return trip to their 
hometown of Cradock.2 They never made it. Instead, the four activists were 
murdered in brutal fashion by the South African Defense Force. Their 
charred and mutilated bodies were found several days later in overgrown 
  
 1. Associate, K&L Gates, LLP; J.D., Cornell Law School, 2009; M.A; Universiteit 
Leiden, 2006; A.B., Harvard College, 2003. Special Thanks to Professors Marlou Schrover 
and Robert Ross who provided valuable thoughts and critiques. 
 2. JILLIAN EDELSTEIN, TRUTH AND LIES: STORIES FROM THE TRUTH AND 
RECONCILIATION COMMISSION IN SOUTH AFRICA 79 (2001).  
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sand dunes near Port Elizabeth.3 The tremendous outcry over the murders of 
the Cradock Four is regularly cited by scholars as the first salvo in the final 
push to end apartheid.4  
This article examines the investigation into the Cradock Four murders 
that occurred after the end of apartheid. Within that context, this article 
particularly examines the goals—and limitations—of reconciliation coming 
from South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). This 
article shows that the TRC regularly pushed for reconciliation, but in the 
case of the Cradock Four, the family members of the deceased victims were 
less interested in reconciliation and apt to favor traditional criminal 
prosecution.  
TRC was one of the political compromises following the end of South 
Africa’s apartheid era.5 Following an act of the South African Parliament in 
1995, the TRC was given the task of “promoting national unity and 
reconciliation,” and also investigated crimes committed during legalized 
apartheid between March 1, 1960 and December 5, 1993.6 Within the 
provision, the TRC had the power to grant amnesty to those who made full 
disclosures about his or her role in apartheid-era crimes.7 The TRC could 
assign accountability, but ideally not in such a way that further divided the 
country and rendered a collective national future impossible.8 In addition to 
the Amnesty Committee, the TRC had two additional committees: the 
  
 3. See CHRISTOPHER NICHOLSON, PERMANENT REMOVAL: WHO KILLED THE 
CRADOCK FOUR? 1-19 (2004).  
 4. See ANTJIE KROG, COUNTRY OF MY SKULL: GUILT, SORROW, AND THE LIMITS OF 
FORGIVENESS IN THE NEW SOUTH AFRICA 58 (1998); see also Michael Tetelman, The Burial 
of Canon J.A. Calata and the Revival of Mass-Based Opposition in Cradock South Africa, 
1983, 58 AFR. STUD. 5, 27 (1998) (noting that on the night of the funerals the South African 
government announced a state of emergency, “[beginning] a reign of terror that would not 
abate for over five years”).  
 5. Eric Blumenson, The Challenge of a Global Standard of Justice: Peace, 
Pluralism, and Punishment at the International Criminal Court, 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L 
L. 801, 860 (2006); see also Richard Goldstone, Justice of the Constitutional Court of South 
Africa, 1998 Otto L. Walters Lecture (Winter 1999), in 15 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 241, 
258 (1999) (calling amnesty “the price for a peaceful transition from apartheid to 
democracy”); see also Emily H. McCarthy, Note, South Africa’s Amnesty Process: A Viable 
Route Toward Truth and Reconciliation, 3 MICH. J. RACE & L. 183, 183 n.1, 184-85 (1997). 
 6. See Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, no. 34, 1995, vol. 361, 
no. 16579 (GG) (S. Afr.) [hereinafter National Unity and Reconciliation Act]. A history of 
the period leading up to the Act is available in the Report’s history of the TRC mandate. See 
1 TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMM’N, TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF SOUTH 
AFRICA REPORT, 48-57 (1998), available at http:// www.justice.gov.za/trc/report/finalreport 
/TRC%20VOLUME%201.pdf.; see also Paul Lansing & Julie C. King, South Africa’s Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission: The Conflict Between Individual Justice and National 
Healing in the Post-Apartheid Age, 15 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 753, 761 (1998).  
 7. KENNETH CHRISTIE, THE SOUTH AFRICAN TRUTH COMMISSION 77 (2000); Dan 
Markel, The Justice of Amnesty? Towards a Theory of Retributivism in Recovering States, 49 
U. TORONTO L.J. 389, 396 (1999).  
 8. Lansing & King, supra note 6, at 761.  
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Human Rights Violations Committee responsible for hearing victims and 
preparing a report on all those who told stories of human rights abuses; and 
the Reparation and Rehabilitation Committee, which made 
recommendations regarding reparations and rehabilitation.9 
Walking a fine line between assigning accountability and promoting 
national unity, the TRC and its leader, Desmond Tutu, offered a justice 
model different from the more traditional retributive justice model of 
criminal prosecution. Instead, the TRC utilized a justice method commonly 
known as “restorative justice.”10 The emphasis of restorative justice is 
healing the community and restoring the imbalance between victims and 
perpetrators.11  
Like other high profile South African amnesty cases,12 the Cradock Four 
amnesty hearings garnered considerable international attention, making it an 
excellent example to reflect on the value of truth commissions and the 
particular challenges of the restorative justice model. As other nations begin 
the process of reconciling their collective pasts through truth commissions, 
the South African TRC and the Cradock Four case illustrates the successes 
and shortcomings of restorative justice. 
This article proceeds with four parts. Section II examines the history of 
truth commissions, and the creation of the TRC and its goals of fostering 
reconciliation. Section III explores the TRC’s utilization of restorative rather 
than retributive justice. Section IV provides an in-depth examination of the 
Cradock Four hearings and the successes and limitations of restorative 
justice. Finally, Section V offers lessons learned from the Cradock Four for 
future truth commissions and the role of restorative justice therein. 
I. TRUTH COMMISSIONS IN CONTEXT 
The creation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, a declaration 
adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1948 following World 
War II, established the first international standard of human rights norms.13 
Though the Universal Declaration of Human Rights existed for more than 
fifty years, excepting the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals immediately 
following World War II, there existed no international mechanism to create 
  
 9. The Report of the Reconciliation Commission summarizes the National Unity 
and Reconciliation Act. TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA REPORT, 
supra note 6, at 55-57.  
 10. See TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA REPORT, supra 
note 6, at 125-26.  
 11. See DESMOND MPILO TUTU, NO FUTURE WITHOUT FORGIVENESS 54-55 (1999). 
 12. See Nkosinathi Biko, Amnesty and Denial, in LOOKING BACK REACHING 
FORWARD: REFLECTIONS ON THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION 193-98 (Charles 
Villa-Vicencio & Wilhelm Verwoeld eds., 2000).  
 13. See generally Laurel Fletcher & Harvey Weinstein, Violence and Social Repair: 
Rethinking the Contribution of Justice to Reconciliation, 24 HUM. RTS. Q. 573 (2002).  
276 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 21:2  
accountability following human rights abuses until the United Nations-
sanctioned tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.14 
Consequently, different governments took divergent tracks to restore a 
nation following civil strife.15 
As a means of nation-building and achieving some measure of justice, 
truth commissions have become an increasingly popular option for societies 
emerging from a conflict or authoritarian rule.16 Generally, these bodies are 
established to investigate a party’s history of human rights violations in a 
particular country, including violations by the military or government.17 
National truth commissions may be sponsored by the United Nations or by a 
nation’s executive or legislative branch.18 The main characteristics of truth 
commissions include: (1) a focus on the past, (2) an investigation of a 
pattern of abuse, (3) a temporary body, and (4) sanctioned or empowered 
status granted by the state.19 In addition to South Africa, notable truth and 
reconciliation commissions have been created in Chile, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, and Argentina.20 Uruguay, the Philippines, Chad, Bolivia, 
Zimbabwe, Ethiopia, Germany, and Uganda also created some of the 
earliest truth commissions.21 
In many cases, truth commissions have achieved significant success in 
documenting past human rights abuses. For example, Argentina’s truth 
commission following the 1983 conclusion of the Dirty War and the fall of 
that nation’s military junta represented one well-known early commission22 
and resulted in the publication of Nunca Mas (Never Again), a document 
recounting victims’ stories and describing military torture and killings.23 
The book remains one of the top selling works of all time in Argentina.24 
  
 14. Id. at 577.  
 15. Hassan B. Jallow, Justice and the Rule of Law: A Global Perspective, 43 INT’L 
LAW. 77, 78 (2009). See also PRISCILLA HAYNER, UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS: CONFRONTING 
STATE TERROR AND ATROCITY 303-11 (2001). 
 16. See HAYNER, UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS, supra note 15, at 303-11; see generally Tim 
Kelsall, Truth, Lies, Ritual: Preliminary Reflections on the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission in Sierra Leone, 27 HUM. RTS. Q. 361 (2005).  
 17. Priscilla Hayner, Fifteen Truth Commissions-1974 to 1994: A Comparative 
Study, 16 HUM. RTS. Q. 597, 600 (1994).  
 18. Id. at 600, 604.  
 19. Andrea Kupfer Schneider, The Intersection of Dispute Systems Design and 
Transitional Justice, 14 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 289, 304 (2009). See also HAYNER, 
UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS, supra note 15, at 14.  
 20. Thomas Buergenthal, Truth Commissions: Between Impunity and Prosecution, 
38 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 217, 221 (2006). 
 21. Hayner, Fifteen Truth Commissions-1974 to 1994: A Comparative Study, supra 
note 17, at 600.  
 22. Ruti G. Teitel, Transitional Justice Genealogy, 16. HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 69, 78 
(2003).  
 23. TINA ROSENBERG, Afterword to MARTIN MEREDITH, COMING TO TERMS: SOUTH 
AFRICA’S SEARCH FOR TRUTH 325, 334 (1999).  
 24. HAYNER, UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS, supra note 15, at 34.  
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One of the most significant issues surrounding truth commissions is 
whether participants will be entitled to amnesty.25 The notion of amnesty 
comes in multiple forms (such as blanket amnesty or self-amnesties), but 
conditional amnesty has achieved the most widespread support in the 
international community.26 As opposed to blanket amnesty, conditional 
amnesty generally requires that an individual meets a predetermined standard 
to receive amnesty for his past human rights offenses. Conditional amnesty 
is typically granted following a determination by a quasi-judicial body that 
an individual or organization has met a threshold for amnesty as established 
by a legislative body.27 The standard criteria include that the individual has 
disclosed the full truth about the crime and that the individual in question 
had a political (rather than personal) motive for committing the act.28 
A. Truth Commissions as a Vehicle for Justice 
Rather than merely establishing guilt or innocence of individual 
perpetrators, truth and reconciliation commissions can focus on broad 
patterns of violence and their causes and, in the process, establish a more 
comprehensive record of past injustices.29 Though commissions may hope 
for the full truth, rapid reconciliation, accountability to perpetrators, 
resolution for individual cases, and reparations to the victims, few of these 
expectations are ever fully realized.30 
Moreover, in recent years, there has been a push to expand the right to 
truth for victims in the context of transitional justice.31 For example, in 
2009, the United Nations Human Rights Council (HRC) adopted a 
resolution for such a right, thereby calling on states to better facilitate fact-
finding related to gross human rights violations.32 Additionally, several 
  
 25. For a general discussion of the use and approval of amnesty in international law, 
see generally Charles P. Trumbull, Giving Amnesties a Second Chance, 25 BERKELEY J. 
INT’L L. 283, 283-345 (2007).  
 26. Kate Allan, Prosecution and Peace: A Role for Amnesty Before the ICC? 39 
DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 239, 242 (2011).  
 27. Id.; see also Leila Nadya Sadat, Exile, Amnesty and International Law, 81 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 955, 1027-28, n. 343 (2006). 
 28. Allan, supra note 26, at 242. 
 29. See Carsten Stahn, Accommodating Individual Criminal Responsibility and 
National Reconciliation: The UN Truth Commission for East Timor, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 952, 
954 (2001). 
 30. See generally Janet Cherry et. al., Researching the ‘Truth’: A View from Inside 
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, in COMMISSIONING THE PAST: UNDERSTANDING 
SOUTH AFRICA’S TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION 17-36 (Deborah Posel & Graeme 
Simpson eds., 2002).  
 31. See Dermot Groome, The Right to Truth in the Fight against Impunity, 29 
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 175 (2011) (tracing the evolution of the “right to truth” as a concept in 
international law). 
 32. Human Rights Council Res. 12/12, Right to the Truth, 12th Sess., Oct. 12, 2009, 
U.N. GOAR, A/HRC/RES/12/12, at 3 (Oct. 12, 2000).  
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international conventions have also affirmed a right to truth, such as Article 
32 of the First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Convention, which sets 
principles governing a state party’s obligations related to the missing and 
the dead. Article 32 notes the parties “shall be prompted mainly by the right 
of families to know the fate of their relatives.”33 Additionally, the Preamble 
of the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from 
Enforced Disappearance, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, 
affirms “the right of any victim to know the truth about the circumstances of 
an enforced disappearance and the fate of the disappeared person.”34 
B. The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
With an extensive budget and a staff of over 200, the TRC was one of 
the most comprehensive truth commissions ever assembled.35 Most notably, 
the commission focused on reconciliation throughout the hearings. The 
TRC was composed of three different subcommittees: the Committee on 
Human Rights Violations where victims could tell their stories, an Amnesty 
Committee where perpetrators could receive criminal amnesty in exchange 
for the truth,36 and the Reparation and Rehabilitation Committee where 
committee members recommended reparations to policy makers.37 Unlike 
  
 33. Article 32 of Protocol 1 states: “In the implementation of this Section, the 
activities of the High Contracting Parties, of the Parties to the conflict and of the 
international humanitarian organizations mentioned in the Conventions and in this Protocol 
shall be prompted mainly by the right of families to know the fate of their relatives.” 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1), June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter First Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions].  
 34. International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance, G.A. Res. 61/177, U.N. Doc. A/HRS/RES/2006/1 (Dec. 20, 2006) 
[hereinafter Enforced Disappearance Convention]; The United Nations Human Rights 
Committee in applying the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 
G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 
U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force Mar. 23, 1976 [hereinafter ICCPR], has determined that the 
next of kin of detained and disappeared family members should be considered victims of ill 
treatment with a right to learn of their family members’ fate. Views of the Human Rights 
Committee under Article 5(4) of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights concerning Communication No. 107/1981, U.N. Doc. A/38/40/Supp.40, 
at 216 (1983) (submitted by: Maria del Carmen Almeida de Quinteros, on behalf of her 
daughter, Elena Quinteros Almeida, and on her own behalf); Maria del Carmen Almeida de 
Quinteros v. Uruguay, Communication No. 107/1981, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/2 (1990) 
[hereinafter Quinteros v. Uruguay]. 
 35. HAYNER, UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS, supra note 15, at 335 (2002). 
 36. See Mary Burton, Making Moral Judgments, in LOOKING BACK, REACHING 
FORWARD: REFLECTIONS ON THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA 
77-85 (Charles Villa-Vicencio and Wilhelm Verwoerd eds., 2000).  
 37. It is important to note that the Reparation and Rehabilitation Committee (RRC) 
only had the power to recommend policy and reparations to the President and Parliament. 
The Committee did not have the authority to actually create programs or policy. See WENDY 
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some truth commissions, the TRC also had fairly broad investigative powers 
and was able to investigate and subpoena witnesses.38 
Reconciliation played a central role—if not the central role—in the TRC. 
Though other truth commissions have included reconciliation as an aim,39 
the TRC incorporated reconciliation to such a degree that reconciliation was 
an often-stated goal of the proceedings.40 According to Priscilla Hayner, a 
noted scholar on truth commissions and transitional justice, reconciliation 
efforts even extended to the amnesty proceedings, with one commissioner 
telling her that decisions were based in part on “what is likely to promote 
reconciliation.”41  
Though the TRC made positive contributions to help South Africa 
recover from its history of apartheid, the hearings alone may not have been 
enough to heal the country.42 Under apartheid, South Africa was violent, 
with the fighting directed at all sides, at all levels.43 Given the violence 
ingrained into South African culture during the apartheid years, some 
scholars have questioned if the TRC actually fostered reconciliation.44  
  
ORR, FROM BIKO TO BASSOON: WENDY ORR’S SEARCH FOR THE SOUL OF SOUTH AFRICA AS A 
COMMISSIONER OF THE TRC 225-31 (2000). 
 38. HAYNER, UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS, supra note 15, at 336.  
 39. In Chile, for example, the commission determined that divisive symbols should 
be eliminated and that space should be made for broad public debate on human rights 
through public forums and cultural activities. While many Chileans argued that reconciliation 
had been achieved in the years following its truth commission in the early 1990s, Hayner 
notes that Chileans must continue to navigate the thorny issues of living and working 
alongside others who either supported or opposed General Pinochet. Id. at 159, 324.  
 40. Cherry et al., supra note 30, at 17, 18.  
 41. HAYNER, UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS, supra note 15, at 156.  
 42. See generally Gavin Bradshaw, Truth, Reconciliation and Resolution in South 
Africa, 32 AFRICANUS 77 (2002). 
 43. See Jack M. Balkin, A Body of Inquiries, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2009, at A11, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/11/opinion/11balkin.html; Carol Strickland, 
The White/Nonwhite Divide, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 3, 2008, at 13, available at 
http://www.csmonitor.com/The-Culture/Arts/2008/1003/p13s03-algn.html; Chris Erasmus, 
South Africa: Feuds, Revenge Drive the Violence, USA TODAY, June 18, 1991, at 13A, 
available at http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy1.cl.msu.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/. 
 44. Gavin Bradshaw questions whether a commission—even if the government is 
fully committed to the prospect and the entity—can transcend years of violence. Piers Pigou 
questions whether the TRC can promote reconciliation. He writes that the TRC only 
scratched the surface of the apartheid conflict and should be viewed simply as the first, 
formal step in the very long process of inquiry into South Africa’s past that might lead to 
some subsequent reconciliation in the future. See generally Bradshaw, supra note 42; Piers 
Pigou, False Promises and Wasted Opportunities?, in COMMISSIONING THE PAST 37 (Deborah 
Posel & Graeme Simpson eds., 2002). 
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II.  RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 
A. Divining Justice: Retributive vs. Restorative 
In contrast to classic responses to gross human rights violations 
emphasizing prosecution,45 the TRC operated with the purpose of bringing 
restorative justice.46 Restorative justice is the theory of justice that 
advocates for repairing the harm caused by criminal behavior.47 Unlike the 
more traditional retributive justice, restorative justice’s emphasis is not 
punishment, but rather healing.48 Also unlike traditional criminal trials, the 
TRC was very much a proceeding that focused on the victims under 
apartheid.49 The goal was to foster social harmony by healing the victim 
while returning the perpetrator to standing in the community.50 TRC Co-
Chair, Nobel Laureate and South African Arch Bishop Demond Tutu 
explained the TRC’s belief in restorative justice:  
We contend that there is another kind of justice, restorative justice, which 
was characteristic of traditional African jurisprudence. Here the central 
concern is not retribution or punishment. In the spirit of ubuntu, the central 
concern is the healing of breaches, the redressing of imbalances, the 
restoration of broken relationships, a seeking to rehabilitate both the victim 
and the perpetrator, who should be given the opportunity to be reintegrated 
into the community he [or she] has injured by his [or her] offense.51 
Tutu refers to “Ubuntu,” a term derived from the Nguni group of 
languages52 and incorporating such concepts as sharing, cooperation, 
harmony, and mutual respect.53 According to Tutu, the concept roughly 
translates to “I am human because I belong.”54 
South Africa’s decision to focus on restorative rather than retributive 
justice was not without controversy. The widow of slain Black 
  
 45. ALEX BORAINE, A COUNTRY UNMASKED: INSIDE SOUTH AFRICA’S TRUTH AND 
RECONCILIATION COMMISSION 279 (2000). 
 46. See generally TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA 
REPORT, supra note 6.  
 47. Id.; Alexander K.A. Greenwalt, Complementarity in Crisis: Uganda, Alternative 
Justice, and the International Criminal Court, 50 VA. J. INT’L. L. 107, 129 (2009). 
 48. See Greenwalt, Complementarity in Crisis: Uganda, Alternative Justice, and the 
International Criminal Court, supra note 47.  
 49. Janine Natalya Clark, The Limits of Retributive Justice: Findings of an Empirical 
Study in Bosnia and Hercegovina, 7 J. INT’L. CRIM. JUST. 463, 480 (2009). 
 50. Frank Haldemann, Another Kind of Justice: Transitional Justice as Recognition, 
41 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 675, 677 (2008). 
 51. DESMOND TUTU, NO FUTURE WITHOUT FORGIVENESS 54-55 (1999). 
 52. Haldemann, supra note 50, at 678.  
 53. Rosa Ehrenrich Brooks, The New Imperialism: Violence, Norms, and the “Rule 
of Law”, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2275, 2335 (2003). 
 54. TUTU, NO FUTURE WITHOUT FORGIVENESS, supra note 51, at 31.  
2013] Truth Commissions and the Limits of Restorative Justice 281 
Consciousness leader Steve Biko challenged restorative justice and its 
amnesty provisions, and the case reached South Africa’s highest court.55 
The court ruled against Biko and in favor of the amnesty clause, noting that 
South Africa’s interim Constitution following the end of apartheid had 
made an explicit decision of “reparation over retaliation” and “ubuntu over 
victimisation.”56 
B. Restorative Justice as a Religious Ideal 
The TRC often couched itself in traditional African values such as 
ubuntu, but the TRC also utilized religion and spirituality in the form of 
hymn, prayer, silent reflection, and candles in memory of the dead.57 The 
religious nature of the proceedings was another source of criticism.58 One 
member of the TRC, a former president of the United Methodist Church, 
acknowledged the criticism, but argued that the religiosity of the 
proceedings should be viewed within South Africa’s overall religious 
character.59  
C. Scholarly Debate Over Restorative Justice 
By utilizing restorative justice, South Africa gave up much of its ability 
to prosecute gross human rights violations. Under the TRC’s amnesty 
provisions, perpetrators of past abuses could receive immunity from both 
  
 55. Steve Biko’s widow writes about her disagreement with amnesty. See generally 
Biko, supra note 12, at 193-98. 
 56. See generally Graeme Simpson, “Tell No Lies, Claim No Easy Victories”: A 
Brief Evaluation of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, CENTER FOR THE 
STUDY OF VIOLENCE AND RECONCILIATION (1998), available at http://www.csvr.org.za/wits/ 
articles/artrcyal.htm; See Hoyt Webb, The Constitutional Court of South Africa: Rights 
Interpretation and Comparative Constitutional Law, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 205, 275 (1998). 
 57. See generally Lyn Graybill, Pardon, Punishment, and Amnesia: Three African 
Post-Conflict Methods, 25 THIRD WORLD Q. 1117 (2004). 
 58. See Ebrahim Moosa, Truth and Reconciliation as Performance: Spectres of 
Eucharistic Redemption, in LOOKING BACK REACHING FORWARD: REFLECTIONS ON THE 
TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA 113, 113-22 (Charles Villa-
Vicencio & Wilhelm Verwoeld, eds., 2000) (describing the TRC victims’ hearings as 
“Christ-centric” and writing that the TRC itself required a suspension of traditional beliefs in 
justice, law and order and further arguing that the TRC “requires a faith in the mysterium of 
the event, a faith in the rite [sic] of reconciliation, a belief in the rituals of confession”). 
 59. BORAINE, supra note 45, at 265.  
(Against this criticism it must be noted that religion has played a 
dominant role in the South African society. In the 1991 census more 
than 70 per cent of those who responded indicated some relationship 
with one or other of the major denominations of the Christian church. 
The remarkable growth of the so-called African independent 
churches is a further indication of the importance that religion plays 
in the day-to-day life of the overwhelming majority of people in 
South Africa.). 
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criminal and civil prosecution if they (1) submitted an application to the 
TRC fully disclosing their role in past crimes, and (2) demonstrated that 
these crimes were politically-motivated.60  
Much like the South African public, scholars have hotly debated the role 
of amnesty in the aftermath of gross human rights abuses.61 More 
specifically, amnesty may contradict the established rule of law and damage 
the perception that justice requires that people answer for the crimes they 
have committed.62  
On the other hand, truth commissions give a real voice to the victims,63 a 
prospect that likely could not have been obtained through criminal 
prosecution.64 Prosecuting mass human rights abuses is a tricky business; 
until very recently, amnesty—”either by law or by default”—has been the 
ultimate result.65 For South Africa, one added difficulty is that the judicial 
  
 60. National Unity and Reconciliation Act, supra note 6, at ss. 16-22. For a full 
report on the amnesty process, see generally TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF 
SOUTH AFRICA REPORT, supra note 6, at vol. 6 § 6; see also Christopher K. Connolly, Living 
on the Past: The Role of Truth Commissions in Post-Conflict Societies and the Case Study of 
Northern Ireland, 39 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 401, 406 (2006). 
 61. Diane Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights 
Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L. J. 2537, 2595 (1991). Advocating retributive 
justice, Diane Orentlicher argues that states have a duty to prosecute past offenses, noting 
that the world community “has resolved emphatically that it will not countenance impunity 
for massive atrocities against persecuted groups.” Id. 
 62. See generally id. at 2537-44. 
 63. For example, Andre du Toit argues the victim-center nature of truth commissions 
are more congruent with the ultimate goals of restoring human and civic dignity compared to 
the prosecution of offenders. He notes:  
Criminal prosecutions involve an adversarial system. Consider, for 
example, whether cross-examination of witnesses, including victims, 
is appropriate in the context of a truth commission. Trials focus on 
the perpetrators, whereas truth commissions may choose to focus on 
victims. Perhaps we assume in trials that the focus on the perpetrator 
is compatible with the victim’s interests. We assume, then, that the 
victim desires punishment of the perpetrator. If that means the victim 
must be cross-examined, he is willing to accept it. I do not believe all 
victims think this way. Many are more interested in the restoration of 
their human and civic dignity. This may be difficult to attain in the 
adversarial context of trials. 
Donald L. Hafner, Beyond Traditional Notions of Transitional Justice: How Trials, Truth 
Commissions, and Other Tools for Accountability Can and Should Work Together, 30 B.C. 
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 91, 103 (2007) (citing Andre du Toit, Symposium Comments, in 
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 64. See generally ROSENBERG, supra note 23, at 325, 335.  
 65. ROSENBERG, supra note 23, at 325, 334. See also TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION 
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system is overwhelmed by crime in the country.66 The fledgling government 
had few resources available to investigate, prosecute, and incarcerate 
potential human rights offenders.67 Absent a truth commission, a small 
number of criminal trials are all any country would have accomplished in its 
quest for justice for victims.68 Ultimately, amnesty-for-truth with the goal of 
restorative justice may not have been a perfect solution, but it allowed more 
South Africans to participate in the justice proceedings. Otherwise, the vast 
majority of victims would have been entirely shut out of the process.69 
Finally, the very public nature of the TRC—with its near-constant media 
coverage in South Africa—may have achieved a measure of retributive 
justice in its own right.70 There are differing degrees of retributive justice: 
strong retributive justice that “can punish” and weak retributive justice that 
“can shame or extract contrition.”71 Strong retributive justice is typically 
utilized to restore a balance of pain, no matter how imperfectly it does so.72 
But even without punishing the perpetrator, the TRC can re-equilibrate the 
balance of power between perpetrator and victim.73 Retribution was never 
the Commission’s goal.74  
Absolute amnesty for truth is not the same as restorative justice. 
Restorative justice carries an obligation following violation to make all 
whole again. On the other hand, under the amnesty-for-truth model, a 
perpetrator has no further obligation to redress his wrongs once he has told 
the truth.75 
  
 66. See, e.g., Michael Wines, Wasting Away: A Million Wait in African Jails, N.Y. 
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of the highest reported rates of sexual violence in the world). 
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 70. See generally Charles Maier, Doing History, Doing Justice, in TRUTH V. JUSTICE 
(Robert Rotberg & Dennis Thompson, eds., 2000). 
 71. Id. at 261, 268. 
 72. See Markel, supra note 7, at 404 (discussing retributive justice generally and its 
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 73. Maier, supra note 70, at 261, 268. 
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For the victim, anecdotal evidence suggests the healing power of 
speaking about trauma, with truth-telling as a restorative power in its own 
right.76 The TRC presented its hearings with a tone of safety, without cross-
examining the testimony of victims of torture and other human rights abuses 
or their surviving family members.77 As the TRC redefined its objectives 
over time, it moved away from more established judicial methods.78 
Moreover, the TRC’s operation of truth-through-amnesty likely provides 
a better picture of the atrocities committed under apartheid and paints a 
fuller picture of the history of the regime (rather than the challenging of 
truth that inevitably happens in a criminal trial).79 A court of law is more 
adversarial with competing versions of the truth, but the TRC hearings, 
given their structure, are less likely to have explicit denials and legal 
maneuvering.80 As one scholar asserted: “truth commission may not 
establish the full truth, but they narrow the range of permissible lies, such 
that individuals may no longer reasonably deny the horrors of the past.”81 In 
addition, truth commissions’ inclusive nature may enable survivors to 
regain trust in their own government.82  
III. THE TRC AMNESTY IN ACTION 
In January 1997, seven members of the Port Elizabeth security police 
applied for amnesty in connection with the deaths of the Cradock Four.83 
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 83. EDELSTEIN, supra note 2.  
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The victims’ surviving family members also testified before the TRC about 
the incident.84  
A. Justice from the Victims’ Perspectives 
1. Beginning the Hearings 
The human rights violations section of the TRC had, on the one hand, 
aspects of a legal proceeding, but, at other times, functioned nothing like a 
trial. For example, the witnesses were sworn in when appearing before the 
TRC.85 Though the Human Rights Violations hearings were less legalistic 
than the amnesty hearings, victims were still understood to be “giving 
testimony,” not simply “telling life-stories.”86 After being sworn in, the 
victims were guided through their testimony by Commissioners, who 
largely are able to shape the direction of the testimony with their 
questions.87  
In other ways, the hearings depart from a typical legal proceeding. For 
example, the Commissioners themselves often seemed sympathetic to the 
witnesses appearing before them. At a memory service on the day before the 
hearings, TRC Commissioner Wendy Orr sat with the victims’ families, 
including Cradock Four widows.88 On April 16, 1996, just before the 
testimony of Calata, Mkhonto, and Mhlauli, Commissioner Alex Boraine 
addressed the witnesses and the audience at large. Addressing the witnesses, 
Boraine remarked:  
The 27th of June 1985 is a day which will be indelibly printed in your 
minds and in your hearts and in the minds of many, many thousands and 
hundreds of thousands of people in South Africa. Many people within this 
hall and many of us sitting at this table knew your husbands well. We had 
met them, we had worked with them and like you we heard with horror of 
the gruesome killing of those four, the Cradock Four.89  
The oration from Boraine makes another important point: he knew (or at 
least knew of) the victims. Such a close relationship between victim and 
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judge would be considered irregular and questionable in most any legal 
proceeding.  
After Boraine acknowledged his close ties to the victims, he struck a 
collective tone regarding the proceedings. “[E]verybody who comes to this 
Commission is as important as anyone else,” Boraine noted.90 “[E]veryone 
who has suffered is a sufferer, you have come together and you will be 
answering questions about something that was very very painful for you.”91 
Following his remarks of inclusiveness, Boraine offered a sentence of hope: 
“We’re hoping very much that you will find this experience helpful and 
healing and in the end will enable the Commission to be of some service to 
you as well.”92 
Witnesses themselves do no appear “cold.” That is, they have been 
interviewed prior to appearing before the Commission. In the transcripts, 
Commissioners often note they have the witnesses’ written testimonies and 
will utilize them as a guide in oral testimony so that all necessary material is 
orally recounted.93 Still, the oral component of the hearings provides an 
emotional record to compliment the historical one.94  
The Commission seemed far more concerned about the women’s views 
about amnesty toward the perpetrators than their financial requests. When 
the women requested financial compensation from the Commission, there 
was no response from the Commissioners, who continued with other 
questions. The Committee’s limited response may be because it had little 
ability to influence financial reparations.95  
2. Finding the Truth and Parsing the Ideas of Justice 
Even before the end of apartheid, Desmond Tutu has been a vocal 
advocate for the idea of restorative justice within South Africa, arguing that 
Africans see justice differently than the traditional Western conception.96 
During the TRC hearings, all four widows and the daughter of Sicelo 
Mhlauli spoke about justice regarding how it relates to the men responsible 
for their husbands’ deaths.97 
When hearing from Nomonda Calata, one of the Cradock Four widows, 
TRC Commissioner John Smith opened by asking whether Ms. Calata 
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wished to learn the identity of individuals responsible for her husband’s 
death:98  
Mr. Smith: The inquest has made a very general finding about your 
husband and those who were responsible for his death. Would you want to 
know the identity of the person or persons who were responsible for your 
husband’s death, and if so, why would you like to know who exactly killed 
your husband? 
Ms. Calata: I’d be very glad to know this person. If I can know the 
individuals who are responsible for this I will be able to understand why 
they did it. Most of the time I can remember that this child, the third born, 
Tommy does not have a picture of his father and the last born has no idea 
at all and they always ask how he was and what he will be doing at this 
time. . . As a mother I always to play [sic] the roles of both parents but I’ll 
be really glad if I can know what happened so that my children can get an 
explanation from me, so that I can say it is so and so and so and so. This 
will probably make me understand. I do not know the reason for their 
cruelty, but I just want to know and my family will also be happy to know 
who really cut short the life of my husband. Not to say that when they are 
old I’m just teaching them to retaliate or to be revengeful, it’s just to know 
who’s done this and who changed our lives so drastically. (Emphasis 
added) 
Mrs. Calata does not delve into the specifics of what she wants done to the 
perpetrators if they are caught; however, she suggests that understanding is 
the most important aspect of these proceedings, similar to the TRC. 
The next witness questioned is Sindiswe Mkhonto, the wife of Cradock 
Four member Sparrow Mkhonto. Commissioner Smith, the questioner, does 
not ask Ms. Mkhonto her specific thoughts on justice, but she offers them in 
the course of the proceedings. Here is the exchange99: 
 
Mr. Smith: Mrs. Mkhonto, what else do you request this Commission to 
do for you, how can the Commission assist you? 
 
Mrs. Mkhonto: What I request from the Commission is that I’d like them 
to make thorough investigations about this and please establish who did 
this to my husband. I do not just want them to be exposed, I want them to 
brought to court [sic] so that justice can be done. (Emphasis added) 
 
In this exchange, it seems quite clear that Ms. Mkhonto does not favor 
amnesty for her husband’s killers. What is more, it seems Ms. Mkhonto 
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 99. Id. 
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embraces the traditional ideal of retributive justice when she notes that she 
wants the killers brought to court so that “justice can be done.”100 
The next participant before the Commission is Nombuyiselo Mhlauli, the 
wife of Sicelo Mhlauli. As the Commission proceedings take their course, it 
seems that like Ms. Mkhonto, Ms. Mhlauli also wants justice in the 
traditional retributive sense. The transcript reads:101 
Mr. Smith: I’m now going to ask you, the inquest court made certain 
general findings about your husband, would you want the Commission to 
use its powers to investigate further to be able to identify the person or the 
persons who are responsible? In other words would you like to know who 
were responsible for the death of your husband? 
Ms. Mhlauli: I’d gladly love to know the murderers of my husband and 
they should also come to the fore and tell their story and the reason why 
they committed such brutal actions, and I think, in order to be able to 
achieve, what we are all hoping for, justice should prevail, the law should 
take its course. (Emphasis added). 
Given the implications of her final sentence, Ms. Mhlauli seems to indicate 
that she favors traditional justice where punishment is meted out in 
exchange for crime. The terms “justice should prevail” and the “law should 
take its course” work together in greater syncopation when referencing 
retributive justice.  
A bit later in the testimony, an unnamed TRC member Ms. Mhlauli her 
opinion about amnesty for the perpetrators. Here is the exchange:102 
Panel Member: If these perpetrators can explain and give an account and 
what would you do if they would request amnesty after the Commission 
has cross-questioned them, and then if the Commission realises that they 
have expressed their views and also giving their explanation for 
committing these brutalities. And what if the Commission is satisfied that 
this explanation is satisfactory and it decides to offer amnesty, what do 
you say about this? 
Ms. Mhlauli: The fact that they should be excused? I’m still moved, and I 
do not want to lie, because my family have [sic] suffered extremely from 
this. My children were extremely affected. We have been miserable for 
quite a long time and it was difficult to guide my child alone as a woman 
without the support of my husband, especially during this period when the 
child is an adolescent. Even if I say these people should be given amnesty, 
it won’t return my husband, but that hand, we still want it. We know we 
have buried them, but really to have the hand which is said to be in a bottle 
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in Port Elizabeth, we would like to get the hand. Thank you. (Emphasis 
added). 
Ms. Mhlauli seems to be against amnesty, though she never annunciates it 
clearly. Still, she notes that amnesty for the perpetrators will not return her 
husband or rectify the years of struggle she endured because of his death.103 
In her testimony, Ms. Mhlauli makes reference to her husband’s hand.104 
Sicelo Mhlauli’s body was recovered without its right hand,105 which was 
long rumored to be with the Port Elizabeth police.106 Ultimately, Ms. 
Mhlauli’s testimony is strongly in favor of retributive justice, given her 
dismissal of amnesty for the perpetrators as bringing any change to her 
life.107  
Following Ms. Mhlauli’s testimony, her 19-year-old daughter Bawuli 
testified before the Commission. Bawuli’s testimony is short, but she 
annunciates the first strong example of restorative justice, as advocated by 
the Commission and particularly Desmond Tutu.108 When asked if she 
would like to know the identity of the perpetrators who killed her father, 
Bawuli responds in the affirmative.109 She adds: 
I would love to know who killed my father, so would my brother, I 
suppose, because it’s very hard for us right now to do anything, because in 
order for us to forget, and forgive, we do want to forgive, but I mean I 
don’t know what to say, we do want to forgive but I mean we don’t know 
who to forgive, we don’t know the killers, you know. And I must say we’re 
all upset about this.110 (Emphasis added). 
Bawuli’s testimony mirrors the restorative justice language where the victim 
must also forgive as part of coming to terms with the loss. 
Bawuli is the final Cradock Four family member to testify for the day. It 
seems that her brief testimony has done the most to move TRC Chairman 
Desmond Tutu.111 Though three of the Cradock Four widows are present 
(Nyameka Goniwe is to testify the next day), Tutu directs most of his 
closing remarks to Ms. Mhlauli, Bawuli’s mother.112 At the close of the 
proceedings, Tutu responds: 
  
 103. See Calata, supra note 87. 
 104. See id. 
 105. GEORGE BIZOS, NO ONE TO BLAME? IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE IN SOUTH AFRICA 164 
(1998). 
 106. See TUTU, NO FUTURE WITHOUT FORGIVENESS, supra note 178-79. 
 107. See Calata, supra note 87.  
 108. See id. 
 109. See id. 
 110. Calata, supra note 87. 
 111. See id. 
 112. See id. 
290 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 21:2  
We are proud to have people like you and your husbands and the reason 
why we won the struggle, is not because we had guns, we won the struggle 
because of people like you. People of incredible strength and this country 
is fortunate to have people like you. And I wanted to say to your daughter 
[Bawuli Mhlauli], that her father where he is looking down, is proud of 
her, and you should feel you’ve done a tremendous job with her . . . And 
that she, your daughter should say, I want to forgive, we want to forgive, 
after what she has experienced, and seen what happened to her mother 
and to her father, and she says, we want to forgive, but we want to know 
who to forgive. We give thanks to God for you, and thank you for your 
contribution to our struggle, and thank you, even it if was reluctant in a 
sense, rightly, thank you for sacrificing your husbands. (emphasis 
added).113 
Tutu also brings his conceptions of religiosity into the TRC with his 
closing remarks. He tells the widows that the deceased Sicelo Mhlauli is 
“looking down” on his daughter with pride.114 Tutu concludes his remarks 
with an odd choice of words: praising the women “for sacrificing your 
husbands.”115 The words seem strange given that the women spent the 
majority of their testimony describing how their husbands were arrested and 
murdered by the South African defense forces.  
Nyameka Goniwe, the wife of Matthew Goniwe, testified the next day 
regarding her experiences.116 Similar to the others, part of Ms. Goniwe’s 
testimony focused on her opinion about amnesty. Commissioner Smith 
leads the exchange: 
Mr. Smith: Now you realise of course that it’s quite possible for persons to 
come forward and to actually admit to the killing of your husband and to 
apply for amnesty to one of the committees of this Commission. What 
would by [sic] your attitude to that. [sic] How would you feel towards 
these people if they were in fact identified and that you were to know that 
these are the people who are responsible for the brutal slaying of your 
husband?117 
Ms. Goniwe: Well I look forward to that. I mean I know it’s difficult after 
suffering such pain and trauma. But we need to know what happened and 
who they are, and also, I mean they have to need to show some remorse. 
Mr. Smith: Are you saying that just coming forward and applying for 
amnesty would not be sufficient, that you would also maybe require a 
person to show remorse for what they have done. 
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Ms. Goniwe: Yes. They have to show us remorse, that they’re sorry for 
what they did. I don’t say that, I mean it would immediately make us 
happy, it’s a challenge, we’re going to be challenged in that kind of way, 
and grapple with that, inside and it will take a long time. Healing takes a 
long time. (Emphasis added).118 
Ms. Goniwe seems to also favor restorative justice as advocated by Tutu, 
with the condition that the perpetrators show remorse for their actions. 
Though Ms. Goniwe notes that she can only forgive the perpetrators if 
they show remorse, there is no such remorse requirement for the 
perpetrators to qualify for amnesty.119 Thus, while Ms. Goniwe might 
require remorse to personally forgive the perpetrators, the Commission 
itself will pay no heed whatsoever to whether the perpetrators are sorry for 
their actions.120 
At the conclusion of Ms. Goniwe’s remarks, Chairman Tutu closes the 
proceedings. In this instance, he does not praise the efforts to achieve 
restorative justice, but instead offers his praise to the four women and all 
South Africans who have struggled against apartheid. Tutu remarks: 
All of you were very young when this happened, and one of the things that 
I think has impressed us is how you have been supporting each other, I 
mean, even yesterday, just sitting together, and you were really children 
when this awful thing happened. . . we are an incredible country with some 
quite extraordinary people. I mean that you can laugh, you can sing, you 
have hope even you [sic] have been traumatized. It gives great hope for 
this land . . .maybe South Africa is God’s favourite, because, and it’s good, 
that we must hear the pain of everybody, and for people to know that this 
freedom was not cheap and that people must learn to nurse it, because it 
was bought at a very very great price.121 
Though reconciliation might have been the stated ideal, the victims at the 
Cradock hearings stated a goal of reconciliation on a very limited basis.122 
Most participants in the truth hearings sought retributive justice.123 Though 
some individuals understood that the political compromises between 
President Nelson Mandela and former President F.W. de Klerk that brought 
an end to apartheid meant that there would be no retribution, the editor of 
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South Africa’s largest black newspaper suggests that the majority of black 
South Africans were initially unaware that there would not be criminal 
prosecutions.124 Victims routinely appeared before Tutu and the 
Commission asking for justice in the retributive sense.125 Of those victims, 
“[m]any were ordinary people who could not be bothered by the niceties of 
political arrangements between Mandela and de Klerk and who felt that the 
law of natural justice should be followed.”126 In addition, many in the black 
press felt that “justice was the only foundation for a lasting 
reconciliation.”127 
B.  Restorative Justice As Seen in the Amnesty Cases 
1. The Amnesty Proceedings 
The amnesty hearings were held for ten days in February and March 
1998 and then recessed until June, when the final amnesty application was 
examined.128 Seven individuals applied for amnesty in relation to the case.129 
Six of the applicants committed the crime itself or helped in the planning of 
the murders.130 A seventh amnesty applicant131 applied for amnesty because 
of his role as an accessory to the crimes after they were committed.132 
Before the first witness in the amnesty hearings spoke, the attorneys 
from all sides addressed the court.133 In the case of the victims and the 
perpetrators applying for amnesty, the written application was a critical 
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component of testimony.134 For the perpetrators, it was used as a jumping 
off point in the quest for “truth.” During the amnesty hearings, nearly all the 
applicants made reference to their amnesty filings.135 In some instances, a 
defendant was asked to read a piece that he had written regarding the crime. 
Unlike the human rights violations proceedings, there was less collaboration 
between the Commissioners and the amnesty applicants.  
2. The Amnesty Hearings in Action 
The first amnesty applicant to take the stand was Johan Martin Van Zyl, 
who also went by the nickname “Sakkie.”136 Van Zyl was a member of the 
South African Defense Force who, as part of his duty, helped plot the 
interception and murder of the Cradock Four. J.A. Booyens, the attorney for 
amnesty applicant Sakkie Van Zyl, walked him through his testimony. 
According to the testimony, Van Zyl claimed that Colonel Van Rensburg 
summoned him to the Colonel’s office and told him the troubles in the 
Eastern Cape required “the elimination” of Matthew Goniwe and his 
associates.137 As part of the attack, the goal was to make the crime appear to 
be the work of vigilantes or AZAPO (Azanian People’s Organization), a 
rival black political organization to the UDF (United Democratic Front).138 
When Van Zyl’s attorney asked about the murders being against the laws 
of the country, Van Zyl replied: “I knew strictly speaking that it was an 
illegal operation, but I knew and I felt that it was an authorised operation . . 
. that I could and should continue with it.”139 Under the amnesty provisions, 
an individual’s violent action must have served some political aim, rather 
simply being an act of violence.140 In regard to amnesty, Van Zyl told the 
Commission: “I am applying [for amnesty] because I feel that the crimes in 
which I participated formed a part of the political struggle of that time. 
Unfortunate as it was, it was nothing else but that and that is what I base 
[my amnesty application] on.”141 
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After a spirited exchanged where the applicant’s truthfulness was 
questioned,142 the Commission asked Van Zyl if he enjoyed carrying out the 
operation. “No, Mr. Chairman,” Van Zyl replied, “To the contrary.”143 The 
chairman asked why Van Zyl committed the crime. “Mr. Chairman, I have 
asked myself that question many times,” was Van Zyl’s response.144 But the 
response was not adequate for the Chair, who pressed Van Zyl for a more 
formative answer. Ultimately, Van Zyl responded, “I think at that time I was 
just so motivated that I was prepared to do anything for this country. Which 
in retrospect was misplaced, but I have no other real explanation as that.”145 
The only hint of restorative justice comes next when the TRC Chair asks 
Van Zyl if he has met with the victims’ families.146 Van Zyl says that he has 
been advised to wait until the proceedings conclude and the amnesty results 
have been announced. “And do you intend to do so, irrespective of the 
results?” the chair asks.147 Van Zyl replies, “I have no objection.” After 
being asked to clarify his answer by the chair, Van Zyl remarks, “I do not 
know if there is any wish from their side to speak to me.”148 Such an answer 
is telling. Restorative justice might be a lofty goal, but Van Zyl seems to 
know nothing about it. He has no idea whether the families even desire to 
speak to him about the event, let alone forgive his role in the murder, which 
would seem to be the ultimate aim of restorative justice.  
3. Restorative Justice in the Case of Eric Taylor 
The most explicit example of restorative justice from any participant in 
the Cradock Four case came from South African Defense Force (SADF) 
member Eric Taylor. Taylor had participated in the Cradock Four murders 
in 1985. Over the ensuing years, he came to realize that his actions 
committed on behalf of the apartheid regime were wrong. During his 
amnesty hearing, Taylor noted that his political point of view began to 
change around 1990, when apartheid came to an end and Nelson Mandela 
was released from prison.149 In addition to a changing political opinion 
against apartheid, Taylor testified that for many years he carried a burden of 
guilt about his role in the Cradock killings.   
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As a result of his guilt, Taylor met with the families of the Cradock Four 
in 1997 to offer remorse for his crimes and to request forgiveness.150 There 
was some disagreement between Taylor and the families, however, about 
what exactly could be revealed prior to his amnesty hearings. Recounting 
that meeting in his amnesty testimony before the TRC, Taylor offered that 
“[I]nitially, in the light of my amnesty application I told them that I was 
there because I was admitting that I had killed these people and I’m asking 
their forgiveness. There was a bit of conflict of interest at a certain stage 
because they asked me to provide them with certain facts. I explained to 
them initially that if I should do that it would have an influence on my 
amnesty application and also I would expose myself to make those facts 
known at that forum [the TRC amnesty hearing].”  
A Dutch Reform minister brought Eric Taylor and the victims’ families 
together in April 1997, but the meeting provided little resolution.150 Upon 
meeting, Nomonde Calata “refused to shake [Eric Taylor’s] hand, but the 
others did so briefly, looking down at the floor.”151 Appearing before the 
families, Eric Taylor asked for the forgiveness of the families. Since the 
meeting was prior to the submission of amnesty applications, Taylor would 
not discuss certain details of the event. The families left the meeting to 
confer. When they returned, Nicholson describes their reaction: Nomonde 
Calata “told [Eric Taylor] that they had traveled many hours to attend the 
meeting. There was not going to be any quick absolution for murdering their 
husbands. No facts; no forgiveness. Taylor looked at [Minister] Coetzee and 
shook his head. His eyes misted with tears and Dominee Coetzee put a 
reassuring hand on his shoulder.”152 
During his amnesty hearing, Taylor describes the emotions of the day he 
met with the victims’ families:  
[Meeting the families] is one of the most difficult aspects of the whole 
process, it was a very emotional occasion because I had this desire, an 
almost expressed desire which I felt. I wanted to meet these families, it was 
really a need which I felt. Amongst others, especially from a Christian 
point of view, I don’t think amnesty at that stage was more important for 
me than reconciliation153 [Emphasis added].  
Reconciliation requires the cooperation of both sides: victims and 
perpetrators. The victim meeting indicates remorse on Taylor’s part for his 
role in the killings, particularly since he arranged to meet the victims’ 
families without external prompting. The idea of restorative justice seems to 
be best demonstrated in this exchange, where victims and perpetrators 
return to equal footing and are able to become part of the community again. 
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Yet this was not the outcome of the meeting. The victims were unable to 
forgive Eric Taylor. Restorative justice was not attained.  
Interestingly, during the hearings, the TRC commissioners seem flippant 
about Taylor’s remorse and his decision to meet with the families. During 
the hearings, Taylor’s attorney asked him where “from the depth of your 
heart came the idea to talk to [the families]?”154 The attorney opposing 
amnesty responded, “He told the witness where it came from Mr. Chairman 
but anyway we will have to see.”155 With that remark, the Chairman 
responded, “Maybe he was talking about different ventricles” in reference to 
Mr. Taylor’s change of heart about the killings.156 While one must 
remember that while remorse has no bearing on the amnesty decisions, the 
reaction of one commissioner toward the witness is telling of the role 
restorative justice played within amnesty hearings. 
4. Restorative Justice in the Amnesty Hearings 
For all the talk about restorative justice and the need for reconciliation, 
there was little of it on display with regard to the amnesty hearings of those 
involved with the Cradock Four. The only example of any question of 
remorse in questions coming from the Committee happened during the 
testimony of Sakkie Van Zyl, who expressed regret for his actions. Eric 
Taylor offered remorse prior to the hearing and recounted his meeting with 
the victims’ families while testifying before the Commission. While the 
family did listen to his confession, full forgiveness did not ultimately 
happen.  And while Taylor clearly expressed remorse during the hearing, 
the attorney for the families opposed amnesty for Taylor and attempted to 
cast him as dishonest and holding back the truth. 
The hearings for victims and the amnesty applications served separate 
functions, and the notion of restorative justice were much more explicitly 
addressed in the human rights violations hearings. Is reconciliation and 
restorative justice only a one-way street? Must the victims initiate the 
healing? In the least, victims must be somewhat open to hear from the 
perpetrators before any sense of restorative justice can be reached. The 
human rights abuses proceedings operated to shape national 
consciousness—or more specifically, that the hearings and media selections 
of testimony have been “made to ‘fit’ a particular narrative of a ‘new’ South 
African history.”157 If this is the case, then it makes sense for forgiveness to 
figure prominently within the human rights hearings, as South Africa’s 
black majority and white minority collectively work to move beyond its 
apartheid past. The amnesty hearings, on the other hand, do not fulfill the 
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role of reshaping the collective consciousness. Consequently, forgiveness 
and remorse figure less prominently. 
5. The Amnesty Decisions 
Following the conclusion of testimony, the Amnesty Committee of the 
TRC reached its decision. For six of the seven applicants, amnesty was 
denied.158 The only applicant receiving amnesty was Eugene de Kock who 
did not participate in the killings, but advised on the cover-up after the 
attacks. 
In order to qualify for amnesty, the Amnesty Act required that the 
offense must be an “act associated with a political objective committed in 
the course of the conflicts of the past” and the applicant must have “made a 
full disclosure of all relevant facts.”159 The Commission questioned whether 
the amnesty applicants fulfilled either aim. On the one hand, the Committee 
questioned whether all the murders were necessary, when Matthew Goniwe 
seemed to be the main target. Specifically, the murder of Sicelo Mhauli 
seemed to be the most questionable since he was not a resident of Cradock 
and the amnesty applicants claimed that the murders were committed to 
ease unrest in the Cradock area. But the Commission does not ultimately 
determine whether all the murders fulfilled a political objective, because the 
Amnesty Committee ruled that the applicants have not been forthright 
before the Commission.  More specifically, the Committee found that “[the 
amnesty applicants’] forgetfulness on crucial issues regarding the events so 
often referred to over the years and their lack of explanation surrounding the 
order, planning and execution of these offences does not lend itself to a 
favourable credibility finding.”  
In the view of the Committee, memory of the events mattered. The 
Amnesty Committee’s view of memory is an interesting departure from 
traditional testimony. It was important for amnesty that perpetrators 
remembered what they had heard over the years, not merely what they 
actually remembered. In traditional testimony, however, an individual is 
expected to separate the two: he is expected to recall only actual memories, 
not what has been reported over the years in the press. The ultimate 
justification was that the applicants (excluding de Kock) “failed to disclose 
everything they know about the murders.“ Consequently, amnesty for the 
perpetrators in the Cradock Four killings was denied. 
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CONCLUSION 
This work explored the idea of restorative justice within the Cradock 
Four case of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Though the notion 
of restorative justice—with both victims and perpetrators restored to their 
place in the community—might be a noble idea, in the Cradock Four case, it 
remained only an idea that did not translate into reality. Some factors 
complicated restorative justice and made the push for restorative justice 
unequal between victim and perpetrator. For example, the promotion of 
restorative justice itself differed depending on the hearings. In the human 
rights violations case, victims were asked their thoughts on reconciliation, 
reconciliation was particularly encouraged, and Committee Chair Desmond 
Tutu was quick to praise any victim who offered forgiveness. In the 
amnesty hearings, Commissioners themselves seemed unmoved and 
unconcerned about restorative justice or fostering much reconciliation 
between the perpetrators and victims’ families. Instead, those hearings 
operated much like a court, with the goal of finding the facts, but offering 
little in terms of reconciliation. 
As much as reconciliation through restorative justice was pushed in the 
victims’ hearings by the TRC, some of the victims seemed unready to 
embrace the concept. In the end, two of the witnesses seemed to favor the 
more-familiar retributive justice, though three others did express a 
willingness to forgive the perpetrators. In the amnesty hearings, Eric Taylor, 
the one perpetrator who best exemplified the ideals of restorative justice 
received no acknowledgment from the TRC. His application for amnesty 
was ultimately denied.  
Reflecting on the amnesty decisions, one scholar posited that, “At best 
[they] were unpredictable and arbitrary. At worst, they entailed an 
unconscious selection process that sanitised the apartheid past and its 
uncomfortable lack of political orthodoxy.”160 The Cradock Four killers did 
not receive amnesty, with the only amnesty nod going to an individual who 
helped cover the crime.  
The difference of victims’ and perpetrators’ emphasis on restorative 
justice may ultimately be the result of the natural order of forgiveness. The 
wronged party must be ready to forgive before any reconciliation can occur. 
In this case, victims may be willing to meet with perpetrators and accept 
repentance. A perpetrator cannot bring restorative justice without a 
receptive victim. This may explain why perpetrator Eric Taylor’s attempts 
at reconciliation were unsuccessfully received. 
Restorative justice is a noble concept. Who wouldn’t want to heal 
victims and restore the wrongs of the past? Of course, restorative justice is 
easier in theory than in life, where the scars and pain are not abstract. In the 
end, the reliance on restorative justice relies on a romantic version of a pre-
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colonial past, a vision Desmond Tutu echoed when he claimed that African 
justice was more concerned with restoring balance rather than punishing.161 
Though ubuntu might be used to promote an inclusive nationalist ideology, 
ubuntu itself glorifies an imagined past.162 
The TRC’s emphasis on reconciliation may have even been counter-
productive.163 As the TRC took its course, it became increasingly clear that 
reconciliation could not simply come through a Commission. With the 
understanding that full reconciliation could not be achieved in such a short 
time, Committee Chair Desmond Tutu even began to change his position, 
arguing that the more reasonable goal for the TRC was to promote 
reconciliation rather than fully achieve it.164 
The Cradock Four hearings exemplify the complexity of the South 
African Truth and Reconciliation Commission as it looked to balance many 
objectives. The TRC was, among other things, about bringing 
reconciliation, uncovering the truth, recognizing and healing victims, and 
fostering equality. The TRC stands alone among truth commissions in its 
attempts to bring reconciliation. Reconciliation was an aim of the TRC, but 
the transcripts of the Cradock Four case show that full reconciliation was 
ultimately not achieved.165 As a test case, the Cradock Four hearings show 
the limits for a truth commission to achieve reconciliation through the 
means of restorative justice. Though a Commission can encourage 
restorative justice on numerous fronts, the divergent victim opinions about 
reconciliation emphasize that the decision to forgive can only be personal.  
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